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Abstract 
Concern about the gender gap in employee 
compensation is an important social and business 
issue.  Effective corporate social responsibility 
requires fair treatment of all employees, regardless 
of gender.  Using a sample of firms that have been 
noted for their ethical behavior, this study examines 
whether ethical firms compensate female CEOs 
comparably to male CEOs.  Our sample of ethical 
firms includes companies listed as one of the “100 
Best Corporate Citizens” by Corporate 
Responsibility (formerly Business Ethics) magazine 
and with data available in Compustat, CRSP, and 
ExecuComp for fiscal years 1998-2009.  We 
hypothesize that ethical firms, relative to non-list 
firms, close (or at least narrow) the gender gap in 
CEO compensation.  Our findings indicate that 
female CEOs of ethical companies are not penalized 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392923 
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for their gender (that is, they do not earn less than 
their male counterparts). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ethical corporate citizenship, CEO compensation, gender, 
and pairwise associations between these variables have been 
empirically explored by academics from many fields of study.  Yet, 
there is a dearth of research that examines all three variables 
simultaneously.  This study seeks to merge these three streams of 
literature, fill this void in prior research, and answer our research 
question: Does the gender gap in CEO compensation observed in 
the broad population of firms narrow or close among a subset of 
ethical companies?  We operationally define “ethical” as inclusion 
on Corporate Responsibility (formerly entitled Business Ethics) 
magazine’s “100 Best Corporate Citizens” list.1 
Ignoring CEO gender, two rationales (the risk argument and 
agency theory) exist to explain an association between ethical 
corporate citizenship and CEO compensation; however, their 
directional predictions differ.  The risk argument predicts a 
negative relation between ethics and CEO pay, both short- and 
long-term.  Consistent with the risk argument, agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Muñoz-Bullón 2010) expects a 
negative relation between ethics and CEO short-term pay; 
however, in contrast with the risk argument, agency theory predicts 
a positive relation between ethics and CEO long-term 
compensation.  
The risk argument suggests ethical firms should pay their 
executives less than comparable non-list firms. We derive this 
expectation by merging two literature streams: ethics research, 
which finds ethical firms are less risky than non-list firms 
(Blazovich and Smith 2011), and executive compensation research, 
                                                 
1 We use the term “non-list” to identify firm-year observations that do not appear 
on the list. 
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which finds less risky companies pay their executives less (e.g., 
Core et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2011; Smith and Watts 1992).  The 
risk argument is consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis 
of Cai et al. (2011); one motivation for this hypothesis is that 
ethical companies experience fewer conflicts of interest between 
top managers and stakeholders (such as stockholders and 
employees), resulting in less firm risk than other companies and, 
accordingly, lower executive compensation. 
While the risk argument predicts a negative relation 
between ethical status and CEO compensation, agency theory 
refines the risk argument and offers unique predictions for various 
compensation elements.  To minimize the principal-agent conflict, 
agency theory proposes compensation should be performance-
based (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).  
Companies reward short-term performance (e.g., achieving a sales 
or earnings target) with annual bonuses and long-term performance 
(e.g., steadily increasing stock price) with long-term incentive plan 
payments, stock grants, and option grants.  Accordingly, agency 
theory holds that annual bonuses encourage the attainment of short-
run goals while long-term incentive plan payments and stock-based 
compensation align executives’ decisions with the long-run 
business strategy and preservation/growth of long-run firm value.  
Prior research demonstrates ethical corporate citizenship is 
associated with better performance (e.g., Roman et al. 1999; 
Waddock and Graves 1997), and creating an ethical corporate 
culture is a long-term process and commitment (Mahoney and 
Thorne 2006); therefore, agency theory suggests that long-term 
compensation should be positively associated with ethical 
corporate citizenship.  Our predictions, which we base on agency 
theory, are consistent with the predictions and findings of Mahoney 
and Thorne (2006).  In our study, we explore the relation between 
ethical corporate citizenship and CEO compensation to provide 
evidence on which rationale, agency theory or the risk argument, 
best explains this relation. 
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In addition to providing a possible explanation for the 
relation between ethics and compensation, agency theory implies 
gender should not influence pay.  Despite this implication, 
numerous studies find a gender pay gap exists, even at the 
executive level (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Elkinawy and Stater 
2011; and Muñoz-Bullón 2010).  Prior studies suggest that the 
gender pay gap may not be attributable to gender but rather to 
human capital differences (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Blau and 
Kahn 1997), which are often correlated with gender but are 
typically not incorporated into empirical studies.  Examples of 
human capital measures include education, experience, leadership 
ability, and reputation (Gray and Benson 2003; Muñoz-Bullón 
2010).  Any pay gap not explained by differences in human capital 
is considered the gender difference, and this residual pay gap has 
been explained in prior studies by Becker’s “taste for 
discrimination” theory (Becker 1971; Bertrand and Hallock 2001; 
Elkinawy and Stater 2011).  This theory suggests employers who 
have a distaste for female workers pay them less than comparable 
male workers.  In our study, we explore the relation between 
gender and CEO compensation, after controlling for differences in 
human capital, to confirm a gender pay gap exists in our sample as 
in prior studies.   
In addition to academic interest in the gender pay gap, 
several non-profit groups (e.g., the American Association of 
University Women, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 
and the National Committee on Pay Equity) focus their efforts on 
increasing awareness of and reducing the gender compensation 
difference.  Ensuring fair treatment of employees, regardless of 
gender, is a laudable social and business goal, and consistent with 
stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984; Maxfield 2007), which 
contends that firms should be concerned with multiple stakeholders 
– including employees.  At the April 2012 White House Forum on 
Women and the Economy, President Obama had this to say about 
the gender compensation gap: 
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When any of our citizens can’t fulfill the potential 
that they have because of factors that have nothing 
to do with talent, or character, or work ethic, that 
diminishes us all.  It holds all of us back… Closing 
this pay gap -- ending pay discrimination -- is about 
far more than simple fairness. 
Academic research can address the extent to which the goal 
of equitable employee treatment is met (or progress toward this 
goal is made).  A number of studies (e.g., Bernardi et al. 2009; 
Bowlin and Renner 2008; Grosser 2009; Muñoz-Bullón 2010; Ngo 
et al. 2003) suggest that one aspect of corporate social 
responsibility is fair treatment of minorities, including women, and 
equitable compensation (i.e., equal pay for equal work) is one 
aspect of treating female employees fairly.  Accordingly, for firms 
that have been identified as ethical, an expectation exists that these 
firms, relative to other non-list firms, are more proactive at 
reducing the gender pay gap.  This study addresses whether the 
gender gap in CEO compensation closes or at least narrows for 
ethical companies, relative to other companies.  
Gender differences matter to women of all generations.  
Sandra Fluke, a 2012 law school graduate who will soon enter the 
legal profession, had this to say about today’s female graduates and 
their expectations on gender pay equality:
 2
   
As a graduating student surrounded by classmates 
about to assume their first jobs, I assure….[you] 
that none of my female classmates is thinking, 
‘Salary isn't that important to me.  I don't plan to 
work hard and don't need to be paid fairly, because 
                                                 
2 Ms. Fluke made headlines recently in U.S. political news as an advocate for 
female healthcare options. We obtained Sandra Fluke’s quote from 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/17/opinion/fluke-equal-pay-for-women/index.html. 
Fluke’s comment was in response to a statement by Wisconsin state Senator 
Glenn Grothman, who asserted that “money is more important for men. I think a 
guy in their first job, maybe because they expect to be a breadwinner someday, 
may be a little more money conscious.” 
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I won't be a breadwinner.  A man will come along 
to take care of that for me.’ 
Equal pay activist Lilly Ledbetter, for whom the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009 is named,
3
 summarizes the effects the gender 
pay gap has had on her life: 
The consequences of unequal pay reach far beyond 
the paychecks women take home every week.  My 
pension and Social Security were based on an 
unfair salary, so over the course of my career, I was 
cheated out of hundreds of thousands of dollars that 
could have gone to my kids’ education or my 
family’s medical bills or to support the shops and 
small businesses in my community.  I also worked 
countless hours of overtime, but the extra pay I 
earned was based on the same uneven scale. 
Gender differences in CEO compensation between ethical and 
other companies may influence a woman’s decision of where to 
begin or continue her employment; stated differently, a woman 
may be more inclined to seek employment in an ethical firm, where 
a commitment to gender parity includes “equal pay for equal 
work.” 
To test our hypotheses, we use OLS regression, with 
clustering on individual CEO, to examine the associations between 
CEO compensation (in total, and components: salary, bonus, 
option grants, stock grants, and long-term incentive plan payments) 
and (a) an ethical company indicator variable, (b) a female CEO 
indicator variable, and (c) the interaction of these two variables.  
Consistent with agency theory and prior research (e.g., Mahoney 
and Thorne 2005, 2006), our regression results indicate CEO salary 
(one of our two short-term compensation measures) is lower for 
ethical companies, while stock grants and long-term incentive plan 
                                                 
3 We obtained Lilly Ledbetter’s quote from 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/24/opinion/ledbetter-equal-
pay/index.html?hpt=hp_c2. 
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payments (two of our three long-term compensation measures) are 
higher for ethical companies.  Consistent with the “taste for 
discrimination” argument (Becker 1971) and prior empirical 
studies (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Elkinawy and Stater 2011; 
and Muñoz-Bullón 2010), our regression results indicate that 
female CEOs are paid less total compensation, short-term 
compensation, stock grants, and long-term incentive plan payments 
than male CEOs, controlling for human capital differences.  We 
find no gender difference associated with the value of option grants 
to CEOs.     
To test whether the gender disparity for CEO compensation 
narrows for ethical companies, we sum our estimated regression 
coefficients.  For five of six compensation variables, our results 
show that the coefficient on the female main effect is negative and 
significant, indicating that female CEOs earn less than their male 
counterparts.  However, for all of these five compensation 
variables, the sum of the coefficients on the female main effect and 
the interaction of female and ethical does not differ significantly 
from zero, indicating that female CEOs of ethical companies are 
not penalized for their gender (that is, they do not earn less than 
their male counterparts).  In answer to our research question – yes, 
among the CEOs in our sample, when a gender gap does exist (i.e., 
for total compensation, salary, bonus, stock grants, and long-term 
incentive plan payments), ethical firms do narrow the gender pay 
gap.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section 
summarizes prior literature and develops our hypotheses.  Then we 
describe our sample selection, present our empirical methods, and 
discuss our results.  The final section concludes.     
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESES 
In the broadest sense, this is an ethics study, examining 
whether businesses identified as ethical provide equitable CEO 
compensation regardless of gender.  While this study falls under 
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the overarching canopy of ethics, it also falls under two other 
academic umbrellas, being both a study of CEO compensation and 
a gender study.  Recently, two streams of research have emerged 
and evolved.  One focuses on the relation between ethical 
corporate citizenship and executive compensation, while the other 
examines the association between gender and executive 
compensation.  Accordingly, we provide a brief review of the 
representative ethics and CEO compensation research as well as 
the gender and CEO compensation research.  In conjunction with 
our review of prior literature, we present our hypotheses.   
 
Ethics and CEO Compensation 
Recent studies have examined the association between 
CEO compensation and ethical corporate citizenship and found 
mixed results (Cai et al. 2011; Callan and Thomas 2011; Mahoney 
and Thorne 2005, 2006).  Using a large sample of U.S. firms from 
1996 to 2010, Cai et al. (2011) find CEOs at ethical firms earn less 
compensation than CEOs at similar non-list firms.  They argue this 
result is consistent with their conflict-resolution hypothesis, which 
they derive from stakeholder theory.  This explanation contends 
that managers at ethical firms proactively consider the interests of 
all stakeholders, not just shareholders; as a result, fewer conflicts 
arise between managers and various stakeholder groups.  Fewer 
conflicts result in lower firm risk and thus lower manager 
compensation.
4
  Cai et al.’s (2011) conflict-resolution hypothesis is 
consistent with our risk argument.  The risk argument holds that 
ethical firms are less risky than non-list firms (Blazovich and 
                                                 
4 One criticism of stakeholder theory is that it does not prescribe an algorithm 
for trading off the competing stakeholders’ interests.  However, proactively 
considering multiple stakeholders’ interests (e.g., giving charitably, offering 
employee benefits, protecting the environment, etc.) rather than focusing 
exclusively on the wishes of shareholders (i.e., increasing stock price) should 
reduce the number of conflicts arising between managers and non-owner 
stakeholders. 
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Smith, 2011), and less risky companies pay their executives less 
(e.g., Core et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2011; Smith and Watts 1992).  
Callan and Thomas (2011) simultaneously examine 
executive compensation, corporate social responsibility, and firm 
financial performance and find differing results from Cai et al. 
(2011); using a sample of large U.S. firms from years 2003 to 
2005, Callan and Thomas (2011) find that CEO compensation is 
positively related to corporate social responsibility.  Using a small 
sample of publicly traded Canadian companies, Mahoney and 
Thorne (2005, 2006) find both a positive and a negative association 
between compensation and ethics; they find a positive relation 
between long-term compensation and ethical corporate citizenship, 
consistent with their hypothesis that long-term compensation 
focuses executives’ attention on long-run initiatives, of which 
corporate social responsibility is one.  However, they find a 
negative relation between short-term compensation and ethical 
corporate citizenship.  Mahoney and Thorne (2006) explain this 
result by arguing that short-term compensation may focus top 
managers’ attention on sales or earnings targets and result in less 
attention paid to other stakeholders’ interests (the focus of ethical 
corporate responsibility).  For example, a CEO who receives a 
bonus if the firm’s earnings per share reach or exceed the 
consensus analyst forecast may dedicate time to managing earnings 
rather than improving relations with community organizations, 
unions, and regulators.  
Mahoney and Thorne’s (2006) hypothesis regarding long-
term compensation is consistent with agency theory, which 
encourages companies to use performance-based compensation as 
a means to promote a desired behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Minnick and Noga 2010; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).  Long-term 
compensation, such as long-term incentive plan payments, stock 
grants, and option grants, links CEO incentives with the long-run 
strategy and long-run performance of the company.  Also, creating 
an ethical corporate culture takes time and requires a long-term 
commitment.  Accordingly, agency theory holds that long-term 
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compensation should be positively associated with ethical 
corporate citizenship. 
To distinguish between the risk and agency theories, we 
examine both short- and long-term measures of compensation, 
consistent with Mahoney and Thorne (2006).  Because building an 
ethical corporate environment requires a long-term commitment, 
we predict a positive relation between ethical corporate citizenship 
and long-term CEO compensation.  Short-term compensation is 
less likely to motivate long-term initiatives, such as developing an 
ethical corporate culture, so we predict a negative relation between 
ethical corporate citizenship and short-term CEO compensation.  
Total CEO compensation has both short- and long-term 
components; therefore, we make no directional prediction on the 
association between ethical corporate citizenship and total CEO 
compensation.  
Several executive compensation studies (e.g., Bertrand and 
Hallock 2001; Muñoz-Bullón 2010; Smith et al. 2011) find the title 
of the executive is associated with the amount of compensation.  
ExecuComp, our compensation data source, contains compensation 
data for the five highest paid executives at each firm.  The 
positions occupied by these executives vary across firms, so 
compensation may vary with the duties and responsibilities of these 
positions.  Accordingly, we exclusively examine CEOs, the most 
homogenous executive position and the one that is consistently 
included in ExecuComp for all firms covered by the database 
(Bugeja et al. 2011).  Limiting our study to CEOs is consistent with 
Mahoney and Thorne (2006).  We state our first set of hypotheses 
as follows: 
H1a:  A negative association exists between ethical 
corporate citizenship and short-term CEO compensation. 
 
H1b:  A positive association exists between ethical 
corporate citizenship and long-term CEO compensation. 
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Gender and CEO Compensation 
 Regarding gender and CEO pay, a recent book 
(Zweigenhaft et al. 2011) examined underrepresented groups 
(women, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans) at 
Fortune 500 Companies.  By January 2011, there had been 74 
Fortune 500 CEOs from underrepresented groups, specifically 24 
white women, 15 African Americans, 15 Latino men, and 20 Asian 
Americans.  Almost all of these CEOs were appointed during 1999 
to 2010.  These appointments were a major change from prior 
decades when virtually all CEOs were white males (Zweigenhaft et 
al. 2011).  Paul and Sahni (2009) find that, after matching male and 
female executives based on size and industry, the gender pay gap 
decreases with increases in job risk.  
According to Bell (2005), cash compensation to female top 
managers was 8 percent less than that to male top managers, while 
total compensation was 25 percent less than that to male top 
managers, after controlling for company size, occupational title, 
and industry.  Using ExecuComp data for years 1992 to 1997, 
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that an unexplained gender gap 
in executive compensation still exists.  Muñoz-Bullón (2010) 
complements prior research by examining a longer time period and 
a measure of variable pay (i.e., differences in the value of exercised 
stock options), finding that 90 percent of the gender compensation 
gap relates to differences in variable pay.  Elkinawy and Stater 
(2011) confirm a gender pay gap and propose that it can be 
explained by the “taste for discrimination” model (Becker 1971).  
This model suggests that, if employers have a distaste for workers 
from a particular group (e.g., women), they will pay them less than 
comparable workers from the preferred group (e.g., men).  
There is still some debate regarding whether and to what 
extent there is a gender pay gap.  Using ExecuComp data from 
1992 to 2004, Adams et al. (2007) find no difference between 
female and male CEO compensation; however, these authors fail to 
control for known determinants of CEO compensation, including 
size and profitability.  Bowlin and Renner (2007) find no 
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difference in compensation due to gender for top executives, 
excluding the CEO, at mid- and small-cap firms.  
Agency theory suggests that compensation should be 
performance-based and thus unrelated to gender (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).  Fair treatment of 
employees (i.e., equal pay for equal work) is also consistent with 
stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984; Maxfield 2007), which argues 
that firms should be concerned with many stakeholders – including 
employees.  It is possible the pay gap attributed to gender may 
actually be due to an omitted correlated variable such as human 
capital.  Education, experience, leadership ability, and reputation 
are human capital characteristics which are typically correlated 
with gender (Gray and Benson 2003; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).  We 
control for differences in human capital by including CEO tenure, a 
proxy used in the literature (Muñoz-Bullón 2010), in our model.   
Concern regarding gender discrimination in executive 
compensation is not limited to the United States.  Chen and Wang 
(2010), using data from 4,485 large firms in Taiwan, empirically 
evaluate glass ceiling effects, analyze whether females face 
discrimination during the promotion process, and find that board 
chairpersons tend to select CEOs of the same gender.  A study of 
top corporate jobs in Denmark estimates a gender compensation 
gap, after controlling for various characteristics (including marital 
status and existence of a young child), of 30 percent (Smith et al. 
2011).  Foster et al. (2011) employ surveys of Canadian Certified 
Management Accountants (CMAs) in 2007 and 2009 to examine 
career-related issues regarding male and female accounting 
professionals working in industry (rather than public accounting); 
results suggest that compensation gaps due to gender seem to be 
diminishing at the top management level. 
To summarize, extant research generally finds female 
executives earn less than male executives (e.g., Bell 2005; Bertrand 
and Hallock 2001; Muñoz-Bullón 2010; Smith et al. 2011); 
however, some research identifies no difference in executive 
compensation due to gender (Adams et al. 2007; Bowlin and 
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Renner 2008).  It appears the influence of gender on CEO 
compensation has not been definitively addressed in the literature.  
We contribute to the literature by testing for gender differences in 
CEO compensation using a large sample of publicly traded U.S. 
companies and including a thorough set of control variables in our 
regression models to capture alternative explanations of CEO pay 
(e.g., firm size, firm risk, CEO human capital, etc.).  Consistent 
with the preponderance of evidence from prior studies, we state our 
second hypothesis as follows: 
H2:  A negative association exists between gender (i.e., 
female) and CEO compensation.   
 
Ethics, Gender, and CEO Compensation 
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, academicians 
from many fields have examined ethical corporate citizenship, 
gender, CEO compensation, and pairwise associations between 
these variables.  Yet, we are aware of no prior study that examines 
all three variables simultaneously.  Theory, practice, and academic 
research suggest there should be a positive relation between ethical 
corporate citizenship and fair compensation of women.  
Stakeholder theory provides one explanation for the link between 
company ethics and gender pay equality (Freeman 1984; Maxfield 
2007).  Stakeholder theory contends that firms are concerned about 
many stakeholders – including employees and the community.  The 
community has a general expectation that companies should treat 
their employees fairly (GlobeSun 2006, as reported in Maxfield 
2007).  In practice, the fair treatment of women is considered by 
ethical mutual fund managers and other responsible institutional 
investors (Brooks 1997).  Academic researchers have asserted that 
gender inequity is unethical and violates the principle of equal 
treatment (Ngo et al. 2003) and as such, companies have a moral 
obligation to strive for gender equality (Thompson 2008).  Several 
studies state that gender equity is an important component of a 
company’s corporate social responsibility (Bowlin and Renner 
2008; Grosser 2009; Grosser and Moon 2005a, 2005b).  We extend 
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prior research and empirically test whether companies noted for 
their high ethical standing treat employees fairly, regardless of 
gender.  Our third hypothesis is as follows:  
H3: Ethical corporate citizenship reduces the effect of 
gender on CEO compensation. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL METHOD 
 
Data 
 Our data sources are ExecuComp, Compustat, CRSP, and 
Corporate Responsibility (formerly entitled Business Ethics) 
magazine’s “100 Best Corporate Citizens.”  We obtain our 
dependent variable, CEO compensation, and two of our control 
variables from ExecuComp.  Compustat provides financial-
statement data and CRSP provides stock return data, which we use 
to construct additional control variables.  Being identified as one of 
Corporate Responsibility magazine’s “100 Best Corporate 
Citizens” serves as our proxy for ethical behavior.  While the 
precise methodology used to create this list is proprietary, the 
magazine does disclose relevant details that support the construct 
validity of this measure.  For example, in 2012, the magazine 
evaluated all firms in the Russell 1000 Index (indicating broad 
eligibility for inclusion on the list) and considered 318 “data 
elements” in seven categories (climate change abatement, 
corporate governance, employee relations, environmental impact, 
financial performance, human rights, and philanthropy).
5
  The 
magazine collects its data from publicly available sources (e.g., 
company websites, CSR reports, audited financial statements, etc.) 
and allows companies to review the accuracy of their data and 
correct factual errors before finalizing the list.  Several studies 
(e.g., Blazovich and Smith 2011; Brammer at el. 2009; Fafatas and 
                                                 
5 Of the 318 data elements, seven (2 percent) include the word “female” or 
“gender.”  Thus, we contend that our Ethical variable captures the broad 
construct of ethical corporate citizenship, not simply the narrow construct of 
gender equity. 
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Hoover 2012; Filbeck et al. 2009; Laksmana and Yang 2009) 
provide precedence for using inclusion on this list as a proxy for 
ethical corporate citizenship. 
 The final sample we use for analysis includes all firms with 
data available in ExecuComp, Compustat, and CRSP for fiscal 
years 1998-2009.  Our full sample contains 13,477 CEO-year 
observations consisting of 2,471 unique CEOs.  Of the 13,477 
CEO-year observations, 739 are associated with 278 unique ethical 
firms. Our initial sample included 12 years of the “100 Best 
Corporate Citizens.” Some attrition occurred due to mergers, 
acquisitions, and delistings; however, most attrition occurred 
because data was not available in ExecuComp.  Lack of 
ExecuComp data was common for our early list years (e.g., for 
year 2009, our final sample includes 96 ethical firms, whereas for 
year 1999, our final sample includes only 36 ethical firms).    
 
Dependent Variables 
Consistent with Mahoney and Thorne (2006), we examine 
total, short-term, and long-term measures of CEO compensation.  
For CEO total compensation, we use ExecuComp data item 
TDC1.
6
  Our short-term compensation measures are SALARY and 
BONUS.  Our long-term compensation measures are the value of 
options granted, the value of stock granted, and the amount paid 
under a long-term incentive plan.  Due to an accounting standard 
change in the reporting of stock compensation, ExecuComp data 
changed during our sample period; as a result, the data items we 
use for long-term compensation vary by year.  For Option Grants, 
pre-2006, we use the ExecuComp data item 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE; post-2005, we use 
                                                 
6 Pre-2006 TDC1 includes salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted 
stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-
term incentive payouts, and all other total.  Post-2005, TDC1 includes salary, 
bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation, grant-date fair value of option 
awards, grant-date fair value of stock awards, deferred compensation earnings 
reported as compensation, and other compensation. 
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OPTION_AWARDS_FV.  For Stock Grants, pre-2006, we use 
RSTKGRNT; post-2005, we use STOCK_AWARDS_FV.  For 
Long-term Incentives, pre-2006, we use LTIP; post-2005, we use 
NONEQ_INCENT.   
Following prior research, we use the natural logarithm of 
our compensation variables (Adams et al. 2007; Elkinawy and 
Stater 2011; Huang et al. 2011; Muñoz-Bullón, 2010) to minimize 
the influence of outliers and create a dataset which approximates a 
normal distribution.  Empirical specification tests and economic 
theory suggest that the natural logarithm of compensation is more 
appropriate for regression analysis than compensation in actual 
dollars (Heckman and Polachek 1974).  For each compensation 
component (e.g., total compensation, salary, bonus, etc.), we 
examine the level of compensation only for firms that utilize that 
particular component.  Because most sample firms do not utilize all 
components of compensation, our sample size varies across 
compensation component.
7
  The dependent variable definitions are 
summarized in Table 1, Panel A.  
 
Independent Variables of Interest 
 Our variables of interest are Ethical, Female_CEO, and the 
interaction of the two.  Ethical is coded 1 if the company is 
identified as ethical, 0 otherwise.  Following Blazovich and Smith 
(2011), a firm in our sample is identified as ethical in year t-2 if it 
is listed as one of the “100 Best Corporate Citizens” by Corporate 
Responsibility (formerly Business Ethics) magazine in year t.  
Because Corporate Responsibility publishes its list early in the 
year, the data used to compile the list is taken from the financial 
statements available during the prior year.  For example, the 2010 
list is compiled during 2009 using the most current data available 
at that time, typically from fiscal year 2008.  
                                                 
7 If we retain only firms that utilize all compensation components, our sample 
contains just 703 CEO-year observations, only 59 of which are Ethical=1. The 
inferences drawn from such a small sample are unreliable and lack 
generalizability. 
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ExecuComp provides CEO gender.  Female_CEO is coded 
1 if the CEO is a woman, 0 if the CEO is a man.  Additionally, we 
incorporate the interaction of Ethical and Female_CEO in our 
model.  The interaction of the two indicator variables is coded 1 if 
the CEO is a woman (Female_CEO=1) and the company is 
 TABLE 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Panel A - Dependent Variables - Compensation
     Total Compensation = Log (TDC1 from Execucomp)
     Salary = Log (SALARY from Execucomp)
     Bonus = Log (BONUS from Execucomp)
     Stock Options = fiscal years 1998 - 2005, Log (OPTION_AWARD_BLK_VALUE from Execucomp)
fiscal years 2006 - 2009, Log (FAIR_VALUE from Execucomp)
Panel B - Independent Variables
     Ethical =
For fiscal years 1998-2005, indicator variable = 1 if firm is on the Business Ethics magazine 100 
Best Corporate Citizens list for the year t + 2 , 0 otherwise
For fiscal years 2006-2009, indicator variable = 1 if firm is on the Corporate Responsibility 
magazine 100 Best Corporate Citizens list for the year t + 2 , 0 otherwise
Corporate Responsibility  is the new name for Business Ethics  magainze
List year - 2 years = data year (e.g. inclusion on list in year 2005 is matched to 2003 financial data)
     Female_CEO = indicator variable = 1 if CEO is female for that year, 0 otherwise; data available from Execucomp
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Variable Definitions 
 
Panel C - Control Variables
     ROA = NI / ((AT + Lag(AT))/2), all three variables from Compustat
     Market_return = Total monthly returns -  total value weighted returns, accumulated by year; both variables from CRSP
     Leverage = ((LT - LCT) / AT), all three variables from Compustat
     Market -to-book = (PRCC_F × CSHO)/(AT-LT), all four variables from Compustat
     Firm_age = number of years firm has been listed in Compustat
     Firm_size = Log (AT from Compustat)
     CEO_tenure = number of years executive has been a CEO, computed using Execucomp data
     Year = indicator variable = 1 if observation is from that year, and 0 otherwise
     Industry = indicator variable = 1 if firm is in two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise
 
 
 recognized as ethical for that year (Ethical=1), 0 otherwise.  See 
Table 1, Panel B for a summary of independent variable 
definitions.   
Control Variables  
 Prior studies show that CEO compensation is positively 
associated with firm size and firm performance (e.g., Bertrand and 
Hallock 2001; Huang et al. 2011; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).  The 
argument is that larger companies are more complex and therefore 
require higher quality, and thus higher paid, managers.  We include 
the natural logarithm of total assets (Firm_size) in our model to 
control for firm size.  To control for firm performance, we include 
both return on assets (ROA) and market-adjusted returns (Return) 
in our model.  We compute ROA using accounting data, 
specifically net income divided by average total assets.  We 
measure Return by annually accumulating monthly raw returns less 
value-weighted market returns.  
Consistent with prior research (Huang et al. 2011; Nichols 
and Subramaniam 2001), we control for company growth 
opportunities by including both market-to-book ratio (MTB) and 
firm age (Firm_age).  We calculate MTB as fiscal-yearend 
common stock price multiplied by number of common shares 
outstanding, divided by book value of stockholders’ equity at 
yearend.  Firm_age is the number of years a firm has been listed in 
Compustat.   
Prior research has found an association between CEO 
compensation and firm risk (Core et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2011; 
Smith and Watts 1992); therefore, we include leverage as a control 
variable in our model.  We compute Leverage as long-term 
liabilities divided by total assets.
8
  
                                                 
8 We also conduct all analyses using cash-flow volatility as an alternative proxy 
for risk, and our results are robust to this change.  Consistent with prior research 
(Albrecht and Richardson 1990; Michelson et al. 1995; Minton and Schrand 
1999), we define cash-flow volatility as the coefficient of variation in a firm’s 
operating cash flows over the six-year period preceding the sample year, 
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Prior studies have found a relation between CEOs’ human 
capital (e.g., their expertise, experience, education, and leadership 
ability) and their compensation.
9
  Since data on an individual 
CEO’s experience, education, expertise, etc. are not available in 
ExecuComp, we proxy for a CEO’s human capital using CEO 
tenure, consistent with Muñoz-Bullón (2010).  CEO_tenure 
captures the experience and expertise aspects of a CEO’s human 
capital.
10
   
                                                                                                             
computed as the standard deviation scaled by the absolute value of the mean. A 
firm is included in the sample if it has at least four non-missing years. 
  
9 Farrell (2005) contends that the gender pay gap exists, not because women face 
compensation discrimination, but because men and women make different 
“lifestyle choices,” such as the number of hours worked, willingness to accept 
risky jobs/hazardous assignments, willingness to change job locations, etc. While 
these “lifestyle choices” clearly do influence the gender pay gap in general, we 
do not believe that these “lifestyle choices” affect the specific gender pay gap 
that we examine (i.e., between men and women who have reached the upper 
echelon in corporate employment: CEOs). Moreover, in our multivariate models, 
we control for firm risk and CEO human capital, variables that likely capture the 
effects of “lifestyle choices” on the gender gap in CEO compensation. 
 
10 Numerous studies provide evidence that mothers earn less than childless 
women (e.g., Waldfogel 1998, Kalist 2008, Glass 2004, Correll et al. 2007, and 
Lundberg and Rose 2000). This finding is referred to as the “motherhood wage 
penalty.” Gough and Noonan (2013) provide an excellent review of the literature 
examining the “motherhood wage penalty” in the U.S. To our knowledge, no 
studies in this literature examine whether a “motherhood wage penalty” exists for 
female CEOs, but two papers are particularly relevant to our setting. First, 
Anderson et al. (2002) suggest that highly educated women (which female CEOs 
unquestionably are) are likely to hold jobs with autonomy, and this autonomy 
allows them to integrate work and family while maintaining a high level of work 
commitment and productivity. In addition, highly educated women typically 
have higher incomes such that they can afford childcare and thus mitigate work-
family conflicts. Second, Budig and Hodges (2010) actually find a motherhood 
bonus for women in the top 10 percent of the earnings distribution (where female 
CEOs unquestionably reside). Thus, while we are unable to control for 
motherhood in our empirical models due to a lack of data availability, we feel 
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Finally, to control for differences in CEO compensation 
that may arise due to macroeconomic factors and industry 
variation, we incorporate year and industry fixed effects.  We use 
2-digit SIC codes for industry.  Table 1, Panel C provides a 
summary of the control variable definitions.   
 
Empirical Model 
For each of our six compensation measures (total 
compensation, salary, bonus, option grants, stock grants, and long-
term incentive plan payments) we estimate the following equation: 
CEO Compensation Measurei,t =  +  β1 Ethicali,t +  
β2 Female_CEOi,t + β3 Ethicali,t × Female_CEOi,t + β4 ROAi,t + 
β5 Returni,t + β6 MTBi,t + β7 Leveragei,t + Β8 Firm_agei,t +  
β9 Firm_sizei,t + β10 CEO_tenurei,t + Yeart + Industryi + i,t                
(1) 
In model (1), i denotes firm, and t denotes year.  Because we 
include the same CEO multiple times (i.e., multiple years) in our 
dataset, the error term is not independent across time.  We correct 
for this effect and heteroskedasticity by clustering on CEO.
11
  To 
eliminate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.   
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Tables 2 through 5 present descriptive statistics.  Table 2 
groups firms according to the number of sample years they were 
recognized as ethical. Table 3 shows mean and median 
comparisons of all dependent and independent variables by ethical 
                                                                                                             
confident that motherhood does not influence the results of our empirical 
analyses. 
 
11 Clustering does not affect coefficient estimates; rather, it adjusts standard 
errors to reflect the presence of multiple observations on the same CEO and 
reduces the likelihood of Type I error. 
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status.  Table 4 reports the same descriptive statistics by CEO 
gender.  Table 5 presents mean and median comparisons of all 
variables by gender within ethical status.   
Our full sample consists of 739 ethical firm-years related to 
278 unique ethical firms, and 12,738 non-list firm-years related to 
2,455 unique non-list firms.  Table 2 partitions our sample 
according to the number of years firms are recognized as ethical 
during our sample period. Ninety-four firms are recognized only 
once during our sample period.  The majority of the firms, 93.2%, 
are identified as ethical in five or fewer years.  Just three firms 
have been recognized as ethical in every sample period year.  
 
TABLE 2 
Number of sample years firms recognized as ethical 
 
 
Number of Number of Percentage of 
sample years unique firms unique firms
recognized
as ethical   
1 94 33.8%
2 73 26.3%
3 48 17.3%
4 29 10.4%
5 15 5.4%
6 5 1.8%
7 3 1.1%
8 2 0.7%
9 1 0.4%
10 3 1.1%
11 2 0.7%
12 3 1.1%
  
278 100.0%
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Descriptive statistics by ethical status are presented in 
Table 3. Two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test) results find 
that mean (median) CEO compensation at ethical firms is 
statistically greater than that at non-list firms, indicating that CEOs 
at ethical firms are paid more than CEOs at non-list firms.  This 
result is consistent across all forms of compensation measured – 
total compensation, salary, bonus, option grants, stock grants, and 
long-term incentive plan payments.  Further, the data suggest that 
this pay difference is not due to differences in CEO human capital 
because tenure, our proxy for human capital, is higher for CEOs at 
non-list firms.  Although the majority of CEOs are men, ethical 
firms are significantly more likely to be female-led; 6 percent of 
ethical firm-year observations report female CEOs relative to 3 
percent of non-list firm-years.  Univariate analysis of our control 
variables (specifically, ROA, Return, and Firm_size), indicates that 
ethical firms are larger and more profitable than non-list firms.  
These differences in size and profitability could explain why CEOs 
at ethical firms receive higher compensation, underscoring the need 
to control for these variables in multivariate, regression analyses.  
The results indicate no significant risk difference between ethical 
and non-list firms.  The results are mixed with respect to growth 
opportunities.  The data demonstrate that, on average, ethical firms 
have higher market-to-book ratios, which suggests that ethical 
firms have more growth opportunities than non-list firms.  
However, the data also indicate that ethical firms are significantly 
older than non-list firms, which suggests that ethical firms have 
fewer growth opportunities.      
Our full sample consists of 399 female CEO observations 
related to 77 unique female CEOs, and 13,078 male CEO 
observations related to 2,394 unique male CEOs. Table 4 presents 
univariate analyses by CEO gender.  Two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-
Rank-Sum test) results demonstrate that for five of the six (all six) 
compensation categories, the mean (median) compensation of 
female CEOs is statistically lower than that of male CEOs,  
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TABLE 3 
Means and medians for ethical firms and all non-list firms in 
the dataset, 1998-2009 
 
 
 
 
indicating that females are paid less than males, even at the highest 
executive level.  It is possible this gender pay difference is due to 
human capital differences; on average female CEOs have shorter 
tenure, our proxy for human capital, than their male counterparts.  
Our findings demonstrate that female-led companies are smaller 
than male-led companies.  There is no statistical difference in ROA 
between female- and male-led companies, indicating that CEO 
gender does not influence accounting profitability.  The results do 
however show that the median Return for female-led companies is 
statistically lower than that of male-led companies, indicating that 
CEO gender does influence shareholders’ expectations of future 
profitability.  Our analysis indicates Leverage is lower for female-
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led companies, suggesting that female-led companies are less risky 
than male-led companies.  This result could indicate a selection 
bias (i.e., female CEOs choose to manage less risky firms) or that 
female CEOs take fewer risks than their male counterparts, 
reducing their companies’ relative appetites for risk.  Either way, 
this difference underscores the importance of including Leverage 
(as a proxy for risk) in our multivariate regression models to 
control for this correlated variable.  We find no statistical 
differences between male- and female-led companies with respect 
to growth opportunities.   
 
TABLE 4 
Means and medians for firms with female and firms with male 
CEOs, 1998-2009 
 
N Mean Median N  Mean Median
Compensation Variables
Total Compensation 399 3115.30 * 1776.00 * 13,078 4230.11 2403.00
Salary 399 578.51 * 517.00 * 13,078 640.02 590.00
Bonus 211 464.99 * 258.80 * 7,745 823.64 450.00
Option Grants 239 1701.25 * 965.76 * 8,688 2292.74 1118.00
Stock Grants 195 1852.59 750.30 * 5,513 2198.52 1138.00
Long-term Incentives 152 1020.14 * 563.96 * 4,741 1266.16 753.42
Variables of Interest
Ethical 399 0.10 * 0.00 * 13,078 0.05 0.00
Control Variables
ROA 399 0.04  0.05 13,078 0.04 0.04
Return 399 0.07 0.03 * 13,078 0.11 0.07
MTB 399 3.06 2.08 13,078 2.80 2.07
Leverage 399 0.15 * 0.11 * 13,078 0.19 0.16
Firm_age 399 24.48  18.00 13,078 25.03 19.00
Firm_size 399 7.13 * 7.07 * 13,078 7.62 7.47
CEO_tenure 399 4.56 * 3.00 * 13,078 6.23 4.00
*Mean (median) for list firms is significantly different from mean (median) for non-list firms at p = 0.05 or better using a two-tailed t-test
   (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test). 
Compensation amounts are listed in thousands. For descriptive statistics, we repot compensation amounts in actual dollars, not the
the natural logarithm.   
Female CEO Male CEO
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As shown in Table 5, 41 (5.5 percent) of the 739 ethical 
firm-years are female-led, whereas only 358 (2.8 percent) of the 
12,738 non-list firm-years are female-led.  At non-list companies, 
female CEOs are paid less than male CEOs; this result is consistent 
for all compensation categories examined.  However, at ethical 
companies, gender pay differences are much less pervasive.  Only 
the means of total compensation, bonuses, and option grants differ 
by gender; there are no median compensation differences by gender 
for any of the six compensation variables.  These descriptive 
statistics provide univariate support for our third hypothesis that 
ethical corporate citizenship moderates the effect of gender on 
CEO compensation. 
Univariate analysis of our control variables indicates few 
differences between female- and male-led ethical companies; they 
are comparable in profitability, risk, and size.  Only average firm 
age differs between these two sub-samples.  In comparison, there 
are many differences between female- and male-led non-list 
companies.  Non-list female-led companies are smaller and less 
risky than non-list male-led companies.  Profitability data are 
mixed.  Accounting profitability does not differ between male- and 
female-led non-list firms; however, median market returns for non-
list female-led companies are less than those of male-led 
companies.  Data on growth opportunities are also mixed.  Non-list 
female-led companies are younger than non-list male-led 
companies, implying female-led companies have more growth 
opportunities.  However, market-to-book ratios do not differ by 
gender, suggesting growth opportunities for non-list companies are 
not influenced by CEO gender.  Regarding CEO human capital, we 
do find gender differences within non-list companies: on average, 
female CEOs have less human capital (as measured by tenure) than 
their male counterparts, underscoring the need to include this 
variable as a control in multivariate models.   
 
 
 
 TABLE 5 
Means and medians for firms with female and male CEOs, by ethical status, 1998-2009 
 
 
 
  
N Mean Median N  Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Compensation Variables
Total Compensation 41 6590.79 * 6760.70 698 8644.57 6369.90 358 2717.27 * 1615.00 * 12,380 3981.22 2305.00
Salary 41 864.91 837.07 698 859.69 859.55 358 545.70 * 500.00 * 12,380 627.63 575.00
Bonus 22 858.64 * 571.08 392 1256.22 693.16 189 419.16 * 248.27 * 7,353 800.58 442.00
Option Grants 33 2708.46 * 1733.30 539 4281.62 2479.90 206 1539.90 * 828.30 * 8,149 2161.19 1061.00
Stock Grants 23 4566.95 4796.30  353 4465.39 3414.40 172 1489.62 * 685.84 * 5,160 2043.44 1056.00
Long-term Incentives 21 2029.42 1884.30 354 2407.24 1932.00 131 858.35 * 477.76 * 4,387 1174.08 704.70
 
Control Variables
ROA 41 0.08  0.08  698 0.07 0.07 358 0.04  0.05  12,380 0.04 0.04
Return 41 0.13  0.10 698 0.14 0.09 358 0.06  0.03 * 12,380 0.11 0.07
MTB 41 5.27  3.98 698 4.03 3.00 358 2.80  1.96  12,380 2.73 2.02
Leverage 41 0.20  0.19  698 0.18 0.16 358 0.14 * 0.09 * 12,380 0.19 0.16
Firm_age 41 43.00 * 51.00 * 698 36.07 37.50 358 22.35 * 17.00 * 12,380 24.41 19.00
Firm_size 41 8.87  8.65  698 9.29 9.35 358 6.93 * 6.84 * 12,380 7.53 7.39
CEO_tenure 41 3.71  2.00 698 4.85 3.00 358 4.66 * 3.00 * 12,380 6.31 4.00
*Mean (median) for list firms is significantly different from mean (median) for non-list firms at p = 0.05 or better using a two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test).
Compensation amounts are listed in thousands. For descriptive statistics, we repot compensation amounts in actual dollars, not the the natural logarithm.
Female CEO Male CEOFemale CEO Male CEO
Ethical firms All non-list firms in dataset
   
 
 
 
 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
We use regression analysis to examine the difference in 
CEO compensation due to ethical corporate citizenship and CEO 
gender after controlling for other factors that affect CEO 
compensation, specifically firm size, performance, risk, growth 
opportunities, CEO tenure, year, and industry.  Table 6 presents 
regression results for the natural logarithm of CEO compensation.  
We calculate p-values using standard errors that cluster by CEO to 
correct for heteroskedasticity and the correlation among 
observations for the same CEO.  Consistent with Mahoney and 
Thorne (2006), we estimate our model using both short- and long-
term measures of compensation as the response variable; however, 
unlike Mahoney and Thorne (2006), we examine three long-term 
compensation measures – option grants, stock grants, and long-
term incentive plan payments.  We examine both short- and long- 
term compensation measures because prior research has found, and 
thus we predict, the relation between compensation and our 
variables of interest depends on compensation type.  We report p-
values based on 2-tailed t-tests because we do not place directional 
predictions on all explanatory variables. 
Our first set of hypotheses (H1a and H1b) predicts a 
relation between CEO compensation and ethical corporate 
citizenship.  Specifically, hypothesis 1a predicts a negative relation 
between short-term compensation (Salary and Bonus) and ethical 
corporate citizenship, and hypothesis 1b predicts a positive relation 
between long-term compensation (Option Grants, Stock Grants, 
and Long-term Incentives) and ethical corporate citizenship.  Total 
CEO compensation consists of both short- and long-term 
compensation; therefore, we make no directional prediction on its 
association with ethical corporate citizenship.  Overall, our results 
provide some support for our predictions.       
After controlling for other factors known to affect CEO 
compensation, we find salary, one of our two short-term CEO 
compensation measures, is negatively associated with ethical 
corporate citizenship.  The relation between Salary and Ethical is  
 TABLE 6 - CEO Compensation, 1998-2009 
CEO Compensation Measurei,t =  +  β1 Ethicali,t + β2 Female_CEOi,t + β3 Ethicali,t × Female_CEOi,t + β4 ROAi,t + β5 Returni,t 
+ β6 MTBi,t + β7 Leveragei,t + Β8 Firm_agei,t + β9 Firm_sizei,t + β10 CEO_tenurei,t + Yeart + Industryi + i,t 
 
Panel A - Total Compensation and Short-term Compensation
Dependent variable:
 
Parameter Parameter Parameter
Independent variables: Prediction Estimate p-value Prediction Estimate p-value Prediction Estimate p-value
Intercept +/- 4.507 <0.0001 +/- 4.706 <0.0001 +/- 3.591 <0.0001
Ethical +/- 0.005 0.9126 - -0.053 0.0940 - -0.075 0.2929
Female_CEO - -0.195 0.0132 - -0.135 0.0013 - -0.252 0.0378
Ethical × Female_CEO + 0.142 0.4681 + 0.144 0.2051 + 0.264 0.2666
ROA + 0.445 0.0004 +/- -0.017 0.7791 +/- 1.087 <0.0001
Return + 0.095 <0.0001 +/- -0.014 0.0686 +/- 0.296 <0.0001
MTB + 0.044 <0.0001 +/- 0.003 0.1957 +/- 0.016 0.0076
Leverage - -0.094 0.2765 +/- 0.107 0.0422 +/- 0.078 0.5480
Firm_age +/- -0.002 0.0364 +/- 0.003 <0.0001 +/- 0.002 0.3185
Firm_size + 0.436 <0.0001 + 0.171 <0.0001 + 0.408 <0.0001
CEO_tenure + 0.011 0.0002 + 0.012 <0.0001 + 0.024 <0.0001
Year +/- +/- +/-
Industry +/- +/- +/-
R
2
45.73% 47.98% 37.38%
Female_CEO  + Ethical × Female_CEO n.s. -0.053 0.6681 0.009 0.8879 0.012 0.9578
 
We cluster by CEO to generate robust standard errors. We omit year and industry indicator variables for concision.  
P-values are based on two-tailed significance tests.
omitted
omitted
omitted
omitted
omitted
omitted
Total Compensation Bonus
N (CEO clusters) = 1,938N (CEO clusters) = 2,471
N (observations) = 13,477
Salary
N (CEO clusters) = 2,471
N (observations) = 13,477 N (observations) = 7,952
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TABLE 6 (continued) - CEO Compensation, 1998-2009 
Panel B - Long-term Compensation
Dependent variable:
 
Parameter Parameter Parameter
Independent variables: Prediction Estimate p-value Prediction Estimate p-value Prediction Estimate p-value
Intercept +/- 3.440 <0.0001 +/- 2.469 <0.0001 +/- 2.615 <0.0001
Ethical + -0.065 0.3660 + 0.182 0.0108 + 0.126 0.0372
Female_CEO - -0.186 0.1354 - -0.223 0.0436 - -0.187 0.0607
Ethical × Female_CEO + -0.032 0.9004 + 0.423 0.0787 + -0.149 0.6563
ROA +/- 0.184 0.3416 +/- 0.257 0.2566 +/- 2.016 <0.0001
Return +/- -0.024 0.3673 +/- -0.044 0.2736 +/- 0.352 <0.0001
MTB +/- 0.091 <0.0001 +/- 0.029 0.0010 +/- 0.021 0.0024
Leverage +/- -0.273 0.0417 +/- -0.270 0.0770 +/- 0.106 0.4391
Firm_age +/- -0.009 <0.0001 +/- -0.005 0.0035 +/- 0.001 0.5402
Firm_size + 0.500 <0.0001 + 0.496 <0.0001 + 0.409 <0.0001
CEO_tenure + 0.021 <0.0001 + 0.012 0.0107 + 0.029 <0.0001
Year +/- +/- +/-
Industry +/- +/- +/-
R
2
40.36% 38.87% 41.62%
Female_CEO  + Ethical × Female_CEO n.s. -0.218 0.2263 0.200 0.4058 -0.336 0.1059
 
We cluster by CEO to generate robust standard errors. We omit year and industry indicator variables for concision.  
P-values are based on two-tailed significance tests.
Option Grants Stock Grants Long-term Incentives
N (CEO clusters) = 2,042 N (CEO clusters) = 1,701 N (CEO clusters) = 1,577
N (observations) = 8,927 N (observations) = 5,707 N (observations) = 4,892
omitted omitted omitted
omitted omitted omitted
 
 
 negative and marginally significant (p = 0.0940).  The estimated 
regression coefficient on the ethical indicator variable is  
-0.053.  Since our dependent variable is measured as the natural 
logarithm of compensation, we cannot use this coefficient to 
directly interpret the percentage difference in compensation 
between ethical and non-list firms.  Rather, we must first translate 
the coefficient as follows: e
β
.  This translation yields the percentage 
difference in compensation associated with the indicator variable, 
in this case ethics (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2003: 379-386; 
Muñoz-Bullón, 2010).  This result implies that CEOs at ethical 
companies earn 5.2 percent lower salaries than CEOs at non-list 
companies.  This result is consistent with both agency theory and 
the research results of Mahoney and Thorne (2006).  The relation 
between Bonus and Ethical is in the correct direction (parameter 
estimate = -0.075); however, this coefficient is not statistically 
significant (p = 0.2929).   
Consistent with agency theory and Mahoney and Thorne 
(2006), we find a positive association between two of our three 
long-term compensation measures and ethical corporate 
citizenship.  The relation between Stock Grants and Ethical is 
positive and significant (p = 0.0108).  This result implies that 
CEOs at ethical companies receive 20.0 percent more stock-grant 
compensation than do CEOs at non-list companies.  The relation 
between Long-term Incentives and Ethical is also positive and 
significant (p = 0.0372), suggesting that CEOs at ethical companies 
receive 13.4 percent larger long-term incentive plan payments than 
do CEOs at other companies. 
Consistent with extant research (e.g., Bertrand and Hallock 
2001; Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Muñoz-Bullón 2010), hypothesis 
2 predicts a negative association between female CEO and 
compensation (i.e., women are paid less than men).  To test this 
hypothesis, we examine the coefficient on Female_CEO.  This 
variable is coded 1 for female CEOs; therefore, a negative 
coefficient indicates females are paid less than males.  After 
controlling for other factors known to influence CEO 
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compensation, our results document a negative relation between 
Female_CEO and total compensation, both of our short-term 
measures of compensation, and two of our three long-term 
measures of compensation.  Because we include CEO_tenure in 
our model, we consider the observed compensation difference 
captured by the Female_CEO indicator variable to be attributable 
to gender rather than differences in human capital.  The relation 
between Total Compensation and Female_CEO is negative and 
significant (p = 0.0132).  This coefficient suggests that the pay 
disparity between male and female CEOs is 17.7 percent.  
Similarly, the relations between our short-term compensation 
measures (Salary and Bonus) and Female_CEO are negative and 
significant.  These results suggest that female CEOs receive 
salaries that are 12.6 percent lower and bonuses that are 22.3 
percent lower than their male counterparts.  We also find a 
negative relation between two of our three measures of long-term 
compensation (Stock Grants and Long-term Incentives) and 
Female_CEO.  The data suggest that the value of stock granted to 
female CEOs is 20.0 percent less than that granted to male CEOs.  
The results also suggest that female CEOs are paid 17.1 percent 
lower long-term incentive plan payments than comparable male 
CEOs.  We find no association between Option Grants and 
Female_CEO, suggesting that female CEOs and male CEOs are 
compensated comparably with stock options.   Our findings 
provide evidence of a gender pay gap even at the highest executive 
level for total compensation as well as most of its components.  
Our results are consistent with prior research (Bertrand and 
Hallock 2001; Elkinawy and Stater 2011) and Becker’s “taste for 
discrimination” argument.  Overall, our results provide support for 
hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that ethical corporate citizenship 
moderates the effect of CEO gender on CEO compensation.  We 
sum the estimated regression coefficients to test whether the 
gender disparity in CEO compensation narrows or closes for 
ethical companies.  Specifically, using t-tests, we compare the sum 
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of the coefficients on Female_CEO and Ethical×Female_CEO to 
zero.  With a t-test, the null (alternative) hypothesis states that the 
sum of the coefficients is equal (not equal) to zero.  Failure to 
reject the null hypothesis would support our prediction for 
hypothesis 3.    
For the five compensation measures where a gender pay 
gap was identified (total compensation, salary, bonus, stock grants, 
and long-term incentive plan payments), we fail to reject the null 
hypotheses that the sums of the coefficients on Female_CEO and 
Ethical×Female_CEO are significantly different from zero.  
Accordingly, these results provide evidence that, when a gender 
gap in CEO compensation exists, that gap closes for ethical 
companies.  It appears ethical firms are gender blind with respect 
to CEO compensation.  The data support our third hypothesis.     
 
CONCLUSION 
 We empirically investigate whether ethical firms minimize 
the gender gap in CEO compensation.  Using a sample of 
companies that have been noted for their high ethical standing, this 
study examines whether ethical firms compensate female CEOs 
and male CEOs comparably.  We explore the relations between 
various measures of CEO compensation and ethical corporate 
citizenship, CEO gender, and the interaction of the two.  We select 
our sample of ethical companies from firms identified among the 
“100 Best Corporate Citizens” by Corporate Responsibility 
(formerly Business Ethics) magazine and for which data is 
available in Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp for fiscal years 
1998-2009.   
 Our study is not without limitations.  We use a sample of 
large, publically traded U.S. firms.  Accordingly, our results may 
not generalize to smaller, privately held companies or non-U.S. 
firms.  As with most empirical research, we rely on proxies to 
estimate some constructs of interest.  Our proxy for ethical 
corporate citizenship is inclusion on Corporate Responsibility 
(formerly Business Ethics) magazine’s “100 Best Corporate 
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Citizens.” Future research may consider replicating our analysis 
using an alternative proxy for ethical corporate citizenship.  
Another limitation is our human capital proxy.  Consistent with 
prior research (Muñoz-Bullón 2010), we suggest CEO tenure is a 
reasonable proxy for some aspects of human capital (e.g., 
experience and expertise).  However, we recognize that CEO 
tenure is not rich enough to encapsulate many other aspects of 
human capital, such as education, leadership ability, and 
reputation. In addition, future research may explore whether 
women pursue top management positions at ethical firms because 
these firms have reduced the gender gap in executive 
compensation. 
Our results suggest the relation between compensation and 
ethical corporate citizenship depends on compensation structure.  
Although we use a different and larger dataset, our results are 
generally consistent with Mahoney and Thorne (2006); however, 
we extend this study by using a larger sample of US (rather than 
Canadian) firms and examining additional compensation measures 
(i.e., stock grants and long-term incentive plan payments).  
Building an ethical corporate environment is a long-term 
commitment; therefore, CEOs who receive long-term 
compensation are more likely to make that commitment.  
Consistent with agency theory, our regression results indicate that 
ethical corporate citizenship is associated with higher CEO stock 
grants and larger long-term incentive plan payments, two of our 
three proxies for long-term compensation; however, we find no 
difference in CEO option grants, our third long-term compensation 
proxy, between ethical and other companies.  Conversely, salaries 
and bonuses are short-term compensation measures and therefore 
do not motivate long-term initiatives, such as fostering ethical 
business practices.  As expected, we find that CEO salaries are 
lower for ethical companies; however, we find no difference in 
CEO bonuses between ethical and other companies.     
Regarding gender, our regression results are consistent with 
extant prior research.  We find that even the highest executives, 
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CEOs, are not immune to pay disparity due to gender.  Even after 
controlling for other factors associated with CEO compensation, 
we find that female CEOs earn less total compensation, less short-
term compensation, less stock-grant compensation, and lower long-
term incentive plan payments than their male counterparts, unless 
they work for an ethical company.  Our regression results indicate 
that female CEOs of ethical companies do not earn less than their 
male counterparts in any compensation category we examined.  In 
answer to our research question, it appears that ethical firms do 
bridge the gender gap in CEO compensation.   
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